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2003），ランキングによる通約可能性（Espeland & Sauder, 2007），そして研究業績のゲーミング

































































































































































































































































































































分類 中期計画項目 記載率 分類 中期計画項目 記載率
法令遵守 研究費不正・研究不正防止の取組 100 教育 インターンシップの充実 87
法令遵守 情報セキュリティの取組 98 財務改善 寄付金受入額の向上 87
研究 特定分野の重点的推進 97 財務改善 民間企業からの研究資金獲得額向上 86
教育 アクティブ・ラーニングの導入 95 教育 ナンバリング・カリキュラムマップ 85
組織運営 年俸制の推進 95 組織運営 女性教員数・比率の向上 85
組織運営 女性管理職比率の向上 95 グローバル化 外国人留学生の受入数・比率の向上 83
財務改善 公的研究資金獲得額・採択件数 95 研究 産学共同研究件数の向上 80
研究 国際共同研究 94 グローバル化 外国人留学生の生活支援の実施 79
教育 社会人学び直しの促進に関する取組 93 組織見直し 大学院の組織見直し計画 77
グローバル化 日本人学生の海外留学数・比率向上 93 研究 URAの活用 74
組織運営 監査機能の充実 92 教育 学修時間確保の取組 71
研究 若手研究者の育成 92 グローバル化 外国人教員数・比率の向上 63
社会連携 地方自治体・地元企業との共同研究 92 組織見直し 学部組織見直し計画 51
組織運営 IR機能の強化 91 教育 ジョイント・ディグリーの実施 29
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On the Survival of Higher Education as an Organization
─ Self-discipline ─
Masashi FUJIMURA＊
　　The purpose of this paper is to explore the question: Why do academic professionals and universities 
surrender their individual and institutional autonomy? This paper looks at the case of National University 
Corporations (NUCs) in Japan. It traces how they have progressively surrendered their institutional autonomy 
and acquiesced to the demands of government through the lens of sociological institutionalization and new 
institutional economics (principal-agent theory). The main findings of the analysis are as follows.
　　Firstly, this paper identifies a principal-agent relationship not only between government and national 
universities, but also within NUCs. In national universities, president and boards are principals and faculties 
are their agents. This nested structure of PA relationships is characteristic of NUCs. In this context, the erosion 
of individual autonomy emerged under reforms to the school education act, which prescribes the function of 
faculty meetings, constraining its role in academic affairs and educational matters such as admissions and 
graduation.
　　Secondly, this paper also examines responses to coercive isomorphism in NUCs. The national 
government, as principal, is identified as a force for coercive isomorphism. Using its role as the provider of 
contracts, it exerts pressures to conform to the recommendations of University Council and Cabinet Office, 
and engenders a focus on economic growth and efficiency of management through mid-term plans. As a result 
of such coerced isomorphism, the mid-term plans of 86 National Universities are virtually identical despite the 
variable strengths and institutional missions of each national university.
　　Thirdly, the National University Corporation Law as a form of discipline defines only general outlines of 
university structure and governance. Many finer points such as financial burdens are left to the operational 
discretion of government. As a result of the incomplete nature of these contracts, the Ministry of Education’s 
status as funder encourages NUCs to exercise self-discipline and conform to the funder’s expectations, which 
further surrenders individual and institutional autonomy of NUCs to the government. 
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